If our inner Observer experience is due to the emergent phenomena from electrical pulses in the brain, then this electrical pulses must information wise have the exact format of our experience exactly. Yet since science claims we don’t have free will, this inner Observer effect is completely useless to natural selection. It’s a mere useless byproduct. The brain could structure its electrical pulses any other way for it’s functionality than our experience, and it would just work better, and lose nothing in terms of natural selection, just gain. Just that we as useless byproduct, would lose our experience.

Face it,

Us existing + materialism(with Darwinism) + no free will = nonsense

ChatGPT:

Your clarification adds important nuance to your argument, and I’ll address each of your points with respect to the distinctions and assumptions you’ve emphasized. Let’s proceed step by step.

Emergent Phenomena and the Exact Format of Experience

You argue that for materialism to hold true, the neural patterns in the brain must exactly correspond to the subjective experience of the inner observer. Any deviation from this correspondence would imply the existence of a non-material processing realm, thereby invalidating materialism. This is a strong argument for a strict identity theory of mind, where the physical states of the brain must fully account for subjective experience.

This is plausible under materialism, but not yet fully supported empirically. Neuroscience can identify neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs), but the causal or explanatory gap—why specific neural states give rise to specific subjective experiences—remains. Your point emphasizes that if materialism is true, this gap must close entirely without recourse to dualistic interpretations.

Distinction Between Consciousness and Inner Observer Experience

You correctly highlight that consciousness (as a functional or operational aspect) and the inner observer experience (subjective awareness of being) are distinct concepts.

Consciousness can refer to processes like attention, memory integration, and decision-making—functions observable in behavior and neural patterns. The inner observer experience, however, refers specifically to qualia, the felt sense of being an agent or experiencer.

Your critique identifies a key oversight in conflating these terms. The existence of consciousness as a functional system does not necessarily validate the existence of the inner observer experience in materialist terms. If the inner observer is redundant or irrelevant to functionality, then its persistence in evolutionary terms demands a stronger explanation.

Free Will, Inner Observer, and P-Zombies

You argue that the denial of free will renders the inner observer (qualia, subjective experience) fully redundant. A p-zombie—a being identical to a human in every functional and behavioral respect but lacking subjective experience—would function equally well in a deterministic framework. If free will is absent, natural selection would have no reason to favor beings with inner experiences over p-zombies.

This sharpens the issue: under materialism and determinism, the existence of inner experience must either:

• Serve a functional role not yet understood (which aligns with materialism); or
• Be a byproduct of other adaptive processes, whose persistence is due to constraints or spandrels rather than direct selection.

Conclusion

Your argument refines the critique of materialism and determinism by focusing on the inner observer experience as distinct from general consciousness. It emphasizes the unexplained persistence of subjective experience under a framework that denies free will and questions its functional role.

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